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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Specific contracts between Russian enterprises, in particular, tolling
contracts, play an important role in determining the economic performance
of Russian firms under transition.
The research made by the authors deals with the market evolution in petrol
and sugar industries. The research aims to show the main characteristics of
Russian markets based on econometric investigation of the behavior of
producers, traders and industrial consumers.
The Introduction presents the alternative approaches to the market
determinants in the economy under transition. The paper shows that high
level of transaction costs inducing the firms to be vertically integrated has
significant influence on the market power in transitional Russia.
Part 1 of the paper is devoted to the general characteristics of the
production-distribution chain. The degrees of producers concentration and
competition in the markets are considered. The origin and growth of new
types of market contracts - tolling contracts, and behavior of entities using
these contracts, their stable economic interactions are shown.
Part 2 analyses the influence of tolling contracts on the economic
performance and social welfare. Tolling contracts are treated as a type of
vertical restrictions. Cournot type model of Russian firms’ conduct shows that
the use of tolling contracts helps to improve economic performance by
means of settling the double mark-up problem. But tolling contracts are not
efficient enough as compared with formal vertical integration. The authors
analyze the reasons why tolling contracts are widely used in Russia in
contrast to vertical integration and more optimal types of vertical restrictions.
Part 3 presents econometric results that have to verify two main hypotheses
concerning the Russian firms behavior that exist in Russian economic theory.
The first hypothesis claims that it is the share of tolling contracts and not the
market share that determines the market power of firms. The second
hypothesis aims to find out whether tolling contracts are used because the
firms have financial problems or due to high transaction costs in the
economy.
The analysis proves the first hypothesis: the share of tolling contracts has
significant influence on the economic performance of Russian enterprises.
The research shows that the main cause of tolling contracts is more likely to
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be connected with the processes of vertical integration due to high
transaction costs than with the general insolvency of Russian firms. Being
originally a tool of insolvency, the use of tolling contracts have become a
kind of strategy that can mitigate opportunistic behavior of the partners and
thus improve economic performance and market power of the enterprises.
The paper implies that competition in Russian markets is limited not only
through high concentration of producers but rather by the institutional and
macroeconomic determinants in general. The domination of special vertical
contracts in Russia now reflects why the property rights enforcement system
is underdeveloped. This phenomenon is the main factor of market
developments in the economy under transition.
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INTRODUCTION
The factors in the Russian economy that determine market structure, entity
conduct and economic performance can be divided into two parts: those of
market character (concentration of sellers, scale effects, vertical integration
and vertical restraints, product differentiation, etc.), and those that are from
the nature of the transition of the Russian economy (special contracts that help
to mitigate Russian economic problems). There are several approaches which
explain these characteristics of markets in Russia.
The first approach considers the special features of Russian markets as an
effect of the monopolisation processes that have been inherited from the
Soviet past in the production and distribution systems. Competitive advantages
are seen as a result of previous development, having no links with the strategic
behaviour of the entity. [16, 31, 35]
According to the second approach, market structure within a transition
economy could be explained on the basis of a high level of transaction costs
caused by higher levels of uncertainty in the transition economy than in the
market economy. Competitive advantage belongs to the entities that are able
to minimise transaction costs. [2, 21]
The third approach sees adaptation processes to market conditions as the
main source of sellers’ monopoly power. The more an entity adapts to the
market, the higher the advantages it has. [17, 19]
Our hypothesis is that it is the special contracts of the entities (and firstly of
tolling contracts) that have the decisive influence on market structure and
economic performance in Russia. As a determinant of performance, the market
share of a seller plays a minor role. The analysis of the petrol and the sugar
markets aims to confirm, develop or reject this hypothesis. The main problem
lies in the analysis of the factors which induce enterprises to use tolling
contracts, and the effects of tolling on the economic performance of suppliers
and refineries both in the petrol and the sugar markets.
The main form of fall-back supply in the petrol market in Russia is tolling
contracts. Tolling contracts have almost crowded out “traditional” relationships in
the buying and selling of goods. According to a tolling contract, the oil refinery
obtains a certain share of its final product in payment for its processing
operations, of 30-35% on average. Tolling contracts are, as a rule, of long-term
character and can exist either in the framework of the general contract on joint
activity or in some other special contracts. But tolling contracts are not exclusive:
a refinery could have several oil or other companies as agents for tolling
contracts. In our sample, the maximum number is 6.
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When concluded, tolling contracts sharply increase the share of the supplier –
the oil companies – in the sales of the final product, as can be seen in Chart 1
in the Appendix. It is interesting that tolling contracts are run alongside the
implementation of a joint production and sales policy in vertically-integrated oil
companies. Moreover, oil companies with better-developed levels of internal
integration (in LUKoil, for example) have begun to use tolling contracts earlier
and more often than companies with less-developed central planning (for
example, Sidanko).1
In the research, both descriptive and analytical tools have been used in order
to investigate the problem and the institutional framework in particular. The
Lerner index of monopoly power and its determinants have been placed at the
centre of the analysis. Well-defined models of oligopoly have been applied to
the competitive analysis of Russian enterprises along with factor analysis. The
theory of vertical integration has played an important role in the theoretical
framework.
Two markets – petrol and sugar – have been analysed. This choice is explained
as follows. In the markets there are new economic agents whose activity is
special for the transition economy. Special contracts of the transition – tolling
contracts – have been developed primarily in these industries. There is a well-
defined information database, including data on each intermediate and
production-level enterprise in the industries.
State statistics and survey data have been used in researching the petrol and
sugar markets. These two sources of information have helped investigate
different features of the markets. State statistics give the possibility of
obtaining objective characteristics for the concentration of sellers, the
geographic borders of the markets, the price level, and the economic
performance of enterprises. Executive surveys permit the drawing of
conclusions on methods of competition, estimates of competitiveness, and
trends in competition. As a result, the whole picture of interdependence
between the non-strategic determinants of market structure, the conduct of
firms and economic performance can be drawn.
                                                  
1 Ezov S (1997): Reforming the tax system in the oil industry. A report of the
joint conference of MTI (USA) and the Institute “Economics School” (Russia),
St. Petersburg, June 15-16.
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1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE PETROL AND SUGAR MARKETS
This section deals with the general characteristics of the relevant markets,
including distribution channels and their recent development, the special
features of contracts in resource delivery, and the economic agents that have
control over the final resource flows in the markets.
The production chain of intermediate product delivery, its processing and final
realisation has been considered as a relevant market. The data obtained
through executive surveys of producers, wholesale traders and consumers
conducted by Goskomstat have been used to determine the product share of
each distribution channel. The characteristics of the sample are in Appendix 1.
The sample of Goskomstat included only a share – although a rather
considerable one – of the relevant firms. That is why State statistics of the
markets have been used as well.
The share distribution of production in the petrol and sugar market between
Russian enterprises has been stable in recent years. The changes in the petrol
and other oil product markets are due to the combination of enterprises into
vertical oil companies, and because of the divisions in the enterprises. That is
true also in the sugar market. At the same time, great changes can be seen at
the level of the realisation of the final product. In the petrol market, the proper
delivery net created by the oil companies is playing a greater role, while the
share of specialised wholesale traders is diminishing in the sale of petrol to the
final consumer.
The concentration of sellers in the petrol and the sugar markets is small. The
analysis has shown (see Part 3) that market concentration has no influence on
monopoly power in the relevant markets. The goal of this investigation into
delivery channels has been to clarify the special institutional conditions for the
supply of both the intermediate and the final product.
An interesting result that has been obtained through survey analysis is that a
large part of final delivery is under the control of the suppliers of intermediate
goods, both in the petrol and the sugar markets. In the petrol market, these
are the oil companies, including their daughter firms; in the sugar market, they
are the suppliers of sugar beet (agricultural enterprises) and new commercial
firms that deal with the wholesale trade of sugar beet and raw sugar. As has
been supposed, an important effect on the channels of distribution of the final
product is achieved with special types of contract: tolling contracts, barter and
commercial credit in the petrol market; tolling contracts in the sugar market.
Important changes can be seen in the distribution channels for raw products. A
preliminary analysis has shown that, in 1997, the share of tolling contracts was
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nearly 100% in both industries. But the distribution channels of final goods
remain the same. Surveys conducted in 1996 have shown that the sources
open to the ultimate consumer for obtaining products are strictly limited.
On the question as to whether there is a free choice of supplier, 77% of the
enterprises surveyed in industry and 70% in transport, but only 40% of
agricultural enterprises, have given a positive answer. The most important
limiting factor for transport and industrial enterprises is the traditions in
relationships (rated as 2.75, with 3 as the highest possible score).
The stability of purchasing channels in the petrol market is seen in the answers
of buyers to the question: “What is the possibility of changing your supplier in
the next year?”, with a score given from 0 (no change) to 3 (will definitely
change). The average rate of change for suppliers is 0.46 in industry (the
lowest possible rate), while it is 1.1 for agricultural enterprises and 2.2 in
transport. The higher the share of producers in petrol delivery for a group of
consumers, the more stable are its relationships with suppliers.
Similar results have been achieved in the sugar market. Wholesale traders
estimate the probability of changes in suppliers to be 1.22 on average:
enterprises in the food processing industry acquiring raw sugar is 0.9; sugar
refineries estimate the probability of buyer changes as 1.02. The highest
possible score is 3.
Market entities estimate the degree of competition as weak. On average, using
the 3-point scale, producers and wholesale traders in the sugar market
estimate the influence of competition on their shares as 1.08; while producers
and wholesale traders in the petrol market have put it at 1.3 and 1.14.
These estimates have turned out to be rather unexpected. In the relevant
markets, there are determinants that should have induced competition. The
goods produced are almost homogeneous, and the strict links between an
enterprise and its supplier could not be explained as the effect of brand loyalty
except, perhaps, given the geographical limitations in the petrol market where
the share of transportation costs in the selling price is 8-10%. In the sugar
market, there are very many sellers that have to face a rather severe
competition against imported sugar. In both markets, excess capacities exceed
the level that could be considered as a tool of the strategic policy of sellers:
constituting 33% in the petrol market and 40% in the sugar market.
The question arises: what is the mechanism that maintains the stability of the
distribution channels in the final product market and prevents market
competition? Our hypothesis is that the answer to the question could be found
through an analysis of the special type of contract existing in resource supply –
that of tolling.
Analysis of Structural Development of Petroleum
and Sugar Markets in the Russian Economy
10
It turned out in the research that, in the sugar market, sharply distinct from the
petrol market in concentration, in the stability of economic links and in
problems with producers, the main type of raw sugar supply comes under
tolling arrangements as well. In 1995, on average 78% of sugar beet was
supplied to sugar plants under tolling contracts. In 1996 the share increased to
83% and in 1997 to 92%.
Tolling contracts are most popular in regions where there is a complete
technological chain in the market from sugar growing to the sale of the final
product. Tolling contracts comprise the junior partner in agricultural enterprises
because the latter have uneven realisation channels: the largest share of the
supply of sugar beet (70-100%) and sugar produced according to tolling
contracts (60-80%) falls on the sole client. It should be pointed out that sugar
refineries are not the major part of vertical integration.
Tolling contracts are mostly involuntary for the producers. That fact has been
confirmed in the surveys. On the question as to whether they freely chose their
supplier, most of the sugar refineries answered negatively. At the same time,
surveys have revealed the low level of satisfaction of sugar refineries with their
suppliers. 83% of the refineries surveyed pointed to their non-satisfaction with
suppliers. The main causes of non-satisfaction were (according to the 3-point
scale): quantity supplied (2.69); breach of obligations (1.63); the special
conditions demanded by the supplier (1.06); and the low quality of raw
materials (1.0).
According to the surveys, almost all the sugar refineries have no choice of
supplier, despite their lack of satisfaction with the existing relationships.
Refineries could be dependent on the next level of the production and
distribution chain – the sugar buyers. Most refineries point out that changes in
distribution channels are unlikely or are even impossible.
The research has revealed that a new type of economic entity is actively
developing in the sugar market, one that is able to play a leading role in
vertical integration in the industry. This type is the new commercial firms or, as
official Russian statistics record, “non-trading commercial institutions”. These
institutions have under their control about 1/5 of sales in the sample, and in
some regions their share is much more. Among the new commercial firms that
have been taken into consideration in the research are two inter-regional
enterprises – “Alfa-Eko” and “Russian Sugar” (both Moscow) – and a regional
one – “Agroinkombank” (Stavropol). The scale of their activity confirms the
possibility of a significant influence on sales structure and product price in both
the local and the national markets.
1. General Overview of the Petrol and Sugar Markets
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For example, Alfa-Eko has under its control 1/3 of the supply of sugar to food
processing enterprises and 1/4 of the supply to wholesale traders in the
Kaluga region, about 20% of the supply to consumer enterprises in Mordovia,
and important shares of sales in some other regions. In the Belgorod region,
four out of the five largest (not only regional but national) sugar refineries have
Alfa-Eko as their dominant or sole supplier on tolling contracts. And three of
them have Alfa-Eko as their major buyer of sugar with the use of barter making
up 50-100% in payment. Besides, this commercial firm controls nearly 17% of
the import of sugar into Russia.
Agroinkombank in the Stavropol region has under its control 40% of the
turnover of sugar beet, with 1/3 on tolling contracts, 2/3 of the sugar sales by
the refineries and an important share of sugar sales in wholesale trade.
Russian Sugar in the Tambov region controls 100% of the sale of sugar by
agricultural enterprises and not less than 75% of the local sugar turnover
produced on tolling contracts. The firm supplies about 20% of the wholesale
trade in the Kaluga region. Russian Sugar has under its control about 2% of
sugar imports into Russia.
These commercial institutions use the following strategy: they set up diversified
companies with the tools that can help influence the entire chain of sugar
production and distribution. The firms are intermediaries between the
agricultural enterprises supplying sugar beet, the sugar refineries, the
wholesale traders and the enterprises consuming the final goods, and can
influence the market structure. With traditional monopoly instruments, such as
pricing policy in both the intermediary and final product markets, the firms
employ the whole range of contracts particular to the transition economy:
tolling, barter, etc.
Possessing general tendencies in the development of vertical integration in the
petrol and the sugar markets, tolling contracts demonstrate particular features.
Intermediate product supply and the sale of final goods received on tolling
contracts are found at the inter-regional level in the petrol market and at the
local level in the sugar market. Different economic entities have initiated
vertical integration. In the petrol market it is the oil companies and their
daughter firms; in the sugar market it is the large intermediaries. One can
suppose that tolling contracts would have different effects on the former and
on the latter. If tolling contracts give a surplus to the agent (we think they do),
the distribution of that surplus between the supplier of the tolling contract and
the receiver would not be the same in the petrol and the sugar markets. If a
refinery is an integral part of the oil company, that should create the tools for
facilitating the acquisition of surplus share by the latter, and tolling contracts,
although having less influence on distribution channels in the petrol market,
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can, nevertheless, have a positive effect on refinery performance. On the
contrary, entities in the sugar market – the users of tolling contracts – have no
interest in increasing performance in the sugar plants. Non-voluntary tolling
contracts here can have a significantly negative influence on enterprise
performance.
So, the general characteristics of the markets have revealed the main
instrument of the economic influence of an agent on distribution channels – the
tolling contracts in raw supply that have been such a major peculiarity of
Russian industry today. The conclusion is that these contracts are now an
important determinant of market developments in Russia.
Tolling contracts have been taken into consideration in our research. A
theoretical model of tolling contracts between supplier and producer, and their
effects on the final goods market, is presented in Part 2. A statistical
investigation of the hypotheses for the influence of tolling on the economic
performance of an enterprise and for the main reasons for using tolling
contracts in Russia is developed in Part 3.
2. Tolling contracts in the Russian economy
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2. TOLLING CONTRACTS IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
Our analysis shows that tolling contracts are one of the most important
features of Russian markets in transition. The share of output of Russian
industries produced from raw materials under tolling contracts is very
substantial. Data characterising the scope of tolling contracts are presented in
table below.
Industry/ Product Share of output produced from the raw material
supplied under tolling contracts (%)
1995 1996
Automobile petrol 37.5 68.9
Diesel fuel 42 71
Granulated sugar 85 78
 Cereals 55.4 n/a
Source: Goskomstat data, statistical reports.
This part of the article is organised as follows: 2.1. contains different
explanations of tolling contracts in the Russian economic literature; 2.2.
contains a description of the problem; 2.3. describes the model; and 2.4.
provides the results of tolling on performance and welfare.
2.1. Brief Review of the Literature
There are several explanations for the use of tolling contracts in the Russian
economy.
1. Tolling contracts are a transient form of vertical restriction. Industrial
organisations in Russia are in the process of transformation from the
independent action of an entity to the formation of vertically-integrated firms.
In fact, the processes of the development of vertical integration have recently
been very intensive in the Russian economy. In the oil industry, there is a clear
tendency towards it. Vertical integration has also increased in the sugar
market, and the most active leading agents have been new wholesale traders,
such as Alfa-Eko, Russian Sugar, etc.
Nevertheless, to have this reason as the sole explanation of tolling contracts is
not sufficient. Firstly, as integration processes are accelerating, tolling
contracts are not used less, but more often. Tolling contracts are not
Analysis of Structural Development of Petroleum
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substitutes but are complementary to vertical integration within property
relations.
Secondly, there are factors that prevent the developed forms of vertical
integration and vertical restraints from being introduced into Russian markets.
They are, in general, the weak mechanisms of property rights and for the
enforcement of contracts, and the under-development of the property rights
and the contracts themselves. This feature of the Russian economy has been
revealed by many researchers. [ 2, 3, 4, 21]
2. Tolling contracts are considered as a tool to settle the problem of non-
payments.
Non-payment can actually explain some specifics of contracts in the Russian
economy. This is true not only for tolling contracts, but also for barter, bills,
commercial credit and other forms of quasi-money. But this approach to tolling
contracts is also insufficient. Alternative forms of payment other than traditional
buying-selling relationships have been in Russia for years and are used
regularly. They can be considered as a part of the special strategic behaviour
of enterprises. [2, 3, 6, 12] That is why they can be analysed independently
from the actual solvency of the enterprises.
For example, the analysis of the sugar market has revealed the existence of
special wholesale traders that use tolling contracts. Contracts between
wholesale traders and sugar refineries were not specific to the central
economy as opposed to the direct links between agricultural enterprises
supplying sugar beet and the sugar refineries. The appearance of tolling
contracts in the relationships between wholesale traders and sugar refineries
is, in fact, a feature of the new Russian economy. For the period 1995-97, the
share of tolling contracts in relationships has increased very significantly. And
this fact tells us that the tolling contracts used by Russian entities – a special
type of relationship different to that existing in the supplier-producer
production chain in the centrally planned economy – can now testify to their
special role in market development.
The results of our analysis (given in Part 4 below) confirm the hypothesis of an
insignificant relationship between non-payment and tolling contracts.
3. The use of tolling contracts can help sharply decrease the tax burden and is
a form of tax evasion.
The explanation of tolling contracts as a form of tax evasion is very popular
among Russian researchers [for example, 4]. As a matter of fact, tolling
contracts can help decrease one of the heaviest indirect taxes, VAT, because,
within a tolling contract, VAT in the book-keeping procedure is set up almost
2. Tolling contracts in the Russian economy
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voluntarily. Recent estimates, however, do not confirm this point: the decrease
of the tax base within tolling contracts is not as large as has been supposed.2
4. Tolling contracts are a form of vertical restriction that result in the most
efficient performance in the Russian economy. This approach supposes the
analysis of tolling contracts in themselves, the causes of their advantages for
suppliers and their suitability for producers. This approach has been developed
in the economic literature, but it is not a leading explanation.
In general, we share this approach and consider such a point in research into
tolling contracts to be one of the most fruitful. According to the leading views
in the Russian literature (see Part 3), the procedure of payments in the Russian
economy makes it impossible to characterise Russian enterprises as profit
maximisers. We think, however, that, despite the special features of these
contracts, one can use the idea of profit maximisation as the main aim of the
firm. In this case, tolling contracts and their effects on market developments
can be investigated within the framework of vertical integration models which
are well-developed in the world economic literature.
The problems of vertical integration in the world economic literature have in the
recent decades been developed in several directions. The common conclusion
is that vertical integration in production and sales can help solve the negative
vertical and horizontal externalities that arise in the supplier-producer and
producer-distributor chain. [22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 32] The total effect of vertical
integration on welfare depends on the correlation of its positive (the solution of
the problem of the principal agent) and negative (market power) features. An
important problem here is the substitutability of contracts given vertical
restraints. The analysis of different contracts between producers and
distributors reveals that, although under complete certainty on costs and
demand many contracts can be treated as full substitutes to help obtain
Pareto-efficiency equilibrium, under uncertainty the effects of contracts are
quite different. [22, 27] Our aim here is to analyse tolling contracts in this
respect and to show their place in the line of other possible vertical restraints
given their merits and drawbacks.
                                                  
2 In the petrol market, tolling contracts yield profits of $8-10 per ton. See
Denisove T. and Sergeeva V. (1998): “A comparative efficiency of oil sales in
inner and outer markets”. Oil-gas institution. February, No. 2 (17), pp. 73-75.
In the sugar market, the tax decrease is not obvious, as has been shown in the
project “Enterprise monitoring” (See Report 1.31: “Investigation of the role of
vertical integration in relationships between producers and distributors and its
effects on the economic performance of firms”, Moscow, 1997).
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2.2 The problem
Empirical analysis shows the importance of tolling contracts for the
development of Russian markets and their significant influence on the
performance of enterprises in refining industries. It seems that tolling contracts
can be considered as a tool of vertical control characteristic of the Russian
transitional economy. The under-developed character of property rights and
the legal system of support leads to advantages to long-term contracts,
including tolling contracts. The influence of tolling contracts on social welfare,
measured as a sum of the producer and consumer surplus, is ambiguous.
Two questions are important here. First is the influence of tolling contracts on
social welfare and economic efficiency. On the one hand, tolling contracts
provide a reduction in the transaction costs associated with the purchase of
raw materials and with the sale of output produced, and thus they lead to
decreases in total costs. On the other hand, tolling contracts, like any form of
vertical control, can lead to market power and entry barriers.
The second problem is the influence of market structure on the profitability of
tolling contracts. Is the supplier of raw materials interested in the growth of
concentration in the market or not? Can tolling operations be profitable for the
supplier of raw materials in the market (of final goods) with a low level of
concentration? Statistical data show that tolling contracts are widespread in the
markets of, for example, granulated sugar where there is a very low level of
concentration. Can we consider market power and monopoly profits due to
tolling contracts in these kinds of markets?
2.3. Model of the Interaction of Firms under Tolling Contracts
We use the standard Cournot model to describe competition in the markets of
final goods. There are n identical producers of the final product in the market.
Let market demand, for simplicity, depend on the quantity sold as:
P =  q - Q,
where qinQ= , ( qi - quantity produced by one firm).
Assume that the producers of final goods use two types of input: input A and
input B. Suppose that firms use these inputs in a fixed proportion (a Leontieff
production function with constant return to scale). Input B is supplied under the
tolling contract with one firm producing intermediary goods B. Assume that
there is zero cost to producing input B. The second type of resources includes
all necessary components for the refining of intermediary goods. The unit cost
of refining is c.
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The conditions of the tolling contract are identical for each firm in the market.
Under these conditions, a part of the output of the refineries a  is sold by
themselves. This part serves as payment for the refining of the raw materials.
We suppose that a  is determined by the supplier of input B (intermediary
goods).   The other part (1 - a ) is retained as the property of the supplier –
the firm that uses the tolling contracts). For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume
q=1.
The profit of a refining firm i is:
( ) qqq
iiii
cP, -= aap
The output of a refining firm depends upon a  (from profit maximisation):
1+
-
=
n
c
q
i
a
q
The price of the market is:
1+
+
=
n
n c
P a
q
The profit of the supplier of input B from the sale of the final product is:
( )aaaap q
i
nP )()1()( -=
The constraint on the choice of supplier is the positive level of output of the
refinery that implies a  to be sufficiently large (a > c ).
The computations allow the establishment of the profit maximising level of a*(
n, c)  :
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)1( 33 -+
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b
The optimal level of a*  decreases with the growth in the number of firms in the
market and increases with the costs of refining  ( 0<
¶
¶
n
a ; 0>
¶
¶
c
a ).
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The profit of the supplier of input B positively depends on the number of firms
in the market. Consider the results of the model. The constraint of the profit
maximisation problem for the supplier of input B is a reaction of the function of
industry output on a . Industry output (Q=nqi) depends on a :
 ( )
1
1
+
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -
=
n
c
n
Q
aa
The profit of the supplier of the raw materials is:
( )( )2Qq1 --= ap
or:
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Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the choice of a * and the effect of a rising
number of producers on the optimal level of a  and industry output.
The market power of the supplier of input B can be shown in the choice of a *.
The supplier of the raw material plays the role of Stackelberg leader in the
market, taking profit due to the advantage of having first move.
We can see that a rising of the number of firms in the market leads to a
decrease in a *, an increase in the equilibrium level of Q and a growth in
profits for the supplier of input B. An intuitive explanation of the profit increase
could be the following: when the number of refining enterprises in the market is
large enough, they lose their market power and their reaction on a decision
about a * becomes more sensible.
On the other hand, a decrease in a * means that the share of industry output
sold by the supplier of input B increases. At the same time, competition leads
to an increase in industry output. The supplier of raw materials never chooses
a level of a * that would lead to equilibrium of quantity and price in the market
associated with inelastic demand. And the decrease in price and the increase
in quantity sold result in an increase in turnover (the total revenue of the
sellers) in the market. The increase in total revenues, with a growth in the
share of the supplier of the raw materials, means an increase in the profits of
the supplier who uses tolling contracts.
2. Tolling contracts in the Russian economy
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Our conclusion is that, in a market in which tolling contracts are used, the
amount of the profit and the level of monopoly power depend on the high
share of the supplier of intermediate goods, in contrast to the high share of the
refinery. The stability of tolling contracts is an important condition for monopoly
power. But the organisation of the tolling contract itself means that refineries
suffer from the lack of financial resources due to the low revenues. It is very
difficult to refuse a tolling contract. In this way, tolling contracts can create
additional barriers to entry in the intermediary goods market and heighten the
strength of the supplier through market power.
2.4 Influence of Tolling Contracts on Social Welfare
Tolling contracts are used in the Russian economy as a possible tool of vertical
restraint. As a form of vertical integration and vertical restraint, tolling contracts
aim at solving in particular the hidden action problem and the double mark-up
problem.
The efficiency of vertical integration can be estimated on the basis of two
criteria:
- the neutralisation of negative vertical externality in the form of double mark-
up, yielding maximum joint profit for the vertically-integrated firm;
- the optimal combination of stimuli and insurance for the agents.
The lower the uncertainty of future demand and production costs, the more
significant is the first efficiency criterion for vertical control. In a fully
determined environment, it is enough to have the decisions of a supplier in
order to ensure the optimal activity of producers. Given an uncertainty in future
production costs (in our case processing costs) and demand, the efficiency of
vertical restrictions depends on the relationships between the stimuli and the
insurance in vertical contracts.
Let us analyse how tolling contracts influence the performance of suppliers and
producers by comparing the indicators of their activity.
- Given independent planning of sales and price, producers can form derivative
demand in intermediate products, and suppliers can maximise profit, subject to
the limitations of residual demand, and thus establish the price of the
intermediate product;
- Under the utilisation of tolling contracts which have been analysed above;
- Given a vertically integrated firm in the market that combines suppliers and
producers, the monopolist sets the price of the intermediate product 
-
Ð  to
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maximise profits subject to the constraints of the derivative demand of
producers.
The sum of the profits for firms that are in the supplier-producer chain
depends on the types of the contracts, as follows:
Independent decision Tolling contract Vertical
integration
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supplier )1n(4
)c1(n 2
+
- ( ) ( )*nq*)(P*1 aaa-
Profit of a
producer
( )
( )2
2
1n4
c1
+
-   ( )cPq -** )( aa
Total profit
of sellers
 
2
2
)1n(4
)c
1) (2n(n
+
-
+ ( )cPnq -* )(* )( aa
( )
4
c1 2-
As our analysis shows, tolling contracts can help solve the double mark-up
problem, but this tool of vertical restraint is sub-optimal compared to the other
instruments of vertical integration, because it does not allow entities to have
vertically-integrated profits and is not efficient [in the sense indicated by 23].
Chart 2 in the Appendix presents the relationship between the profits of sellers
under independent decisions on sales and price (with the double mark-up
problem), under tolling contracts and within a vertically integrated firm. Let
c=0,1; and the number of firms increases from 2 to 20.
One can see tolling contracts as yielding an increased profit for monopolistic
sellers compared to independent decision-making. The additional profit
received, however, is lower than within a vertically integrated institution. Thus,
tolling contracts do not limit vertical constraints.
The higher the additional profit yielded within tolling contracts, the lower the
number of sellers in the market. This confirms the double mark-up problem as
a major source of additional profit.
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The increase in total profits is re-distributed towards the supplier. Tolling
contracts yield additional profits for the supplier, but not for the producer.
Tolling contracts lead to the redistribution of losses where there are
unexpected demand decreases and/or cost increases as well. Intuitively, it is
obvious that, under independent decisions on sales and prices, the feasible
changes in processing costs and demand capacity have no effect on supplier
performance, given the non-existence of non-payments. With tolling contracts,
the profits of the supplier change under the influence of costs and market
demand: the earlier chosen level becomes sub-optimal. The possible losses of
the producer change too: demand corrections influence its profits to a lower
degree than under an independent realisation of the whole lot. At the same
time, the fixed share of production going to the independent sales of the
producer after the tolling contract has been reached limits the possibilities to
low losses or production cost increases.
A rough comparison of possible losses for the supplier and for the producer
under independent sales and under tolling contracts on the basis of partial
derivatives is given below.
One notices the derivative of producer profit to costs to be higher in each value
of the parameter (due to the constraint on the optimal value of a) under tolling
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contracts. At the same time, with low values of a (in particular, where a < 1/3)
the producer’s profits become less elastic to demand.
Thus, we can conclude that tolling contracts offer a higher level of risk for the
supplier compared with an independent decision on sales and prices; the profit
level becomes more elastic to demand and cost. The effect of tolling contracts
on the feasible losses of the producer is ambiguous. Given a low level of costs
and changes in costs, a tolling contract can decrease the feasible losses of the
producer.
The effect of tolling contracts for the sum of profits and the level of losses
during the contract term is as follows.
Profits Feasible losses
Supplier go up go up
Producer go down ?
So, the conclusion is that, under certain circumstances, tolling contracts are
profitable for both parties, for the supplier and for the producer.
The question to be answered now is why tolling contracts are not being
crowded out by the more traditional forms of relationship between suppliers
and producers – vertical integration, in particular – that could increase total
profits. As we know, the combination of supplier and producer in the integrated
company (in the oil industry) does not exclude special tolling contracts at all.
The solutions within vertically integrated institutions seem to be inefficient
because of the principal agent problem. Co-ordinating their interests within an
integrated company (in the petrol market) and outside it (in the sugar market)
needs special contracts to determine the conditions for resource supply and
final product sales. Tolling contracts have their advantage in the simplicity of
enforcement and, thus, their low monitoring costs for the supplier.
In analysing the effects of tolling contracts for resource supply, we have not
taken into consideration the long-run results of such relationships. It should be
noted, however, that tolling contracts could create new entry barriers in the
long-run. This effect could be examined using the model of Aghion and Bolton
[10]: despite the increase in profits and consumer surplus, long-term contracts
could be inefficient and deter industry entrance. The buyer (the producer, in
our case) could have vertically-integrated effects within long-term contracts
where penalties for opportunistic behaviour have been defined. This contract
results in the low probability of entry (low competition) in the market and low
performance in social welfare.
One can say that the current situation in Russian industry offers sufficiently
large possibilities to extract penalties due to the excess capacities of
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producers. The higher the excess capacities, the easier it is for the supplier to
find alternative producers and to punish the enterprise for its opportunistic
behaviour under tolling contracts. The level of excess capacity in industry can
serve as a power which prevents opportunistic conduct under tolling contracts.
3. DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND THE CAUSES
OF TOLLING CONTRACTS: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
This Part contains the description and interpretation of the econometric
analysis in determining the major factors of the Lerner index (a monopoly
power indicator) in the relevant markets and the causes of tolling contracts.
The aims of factor analysis are to show the determinants of economic
performance for producers in the markets and to define the causes of tolling
contracts.
Two hypotheses have been tested. The first hypothesis is that it is tolling
contracts and not concentration and the market share of sellers that determine
the economic performance of Russian enterprises. It is impossible to
distinguish between two determinants of performance – market power and
production efficiency – so the margins of the enterprises have been used as
Lerner indices of the indicators of performance.
Three variables have been chosen as determinants of the economic
performance of an enterprise: the market share of sellers; the share of tolling
resources in supply to producers; and capacity utilisation rates. Data for 1996
have been analysed.
3.1.Petrol Market: Refineries
In the petrol market, the analysis has been carried out on the basis of a panel
of 31 refineries that produce 91% of the total output of the industry. Six
indicators have been used: the Lerner index; the market share of oil
companies; the tolling share in supply to the producer; the capacity utilisation
rate; the share of the oil supply by the oil company to which system the
refinery belongs; and the share of insolvency in total enterprise arrears.
The descriptive statistics for the database is in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The correlation between enterprise size and tolling share is zero.
The sample has large suppliers (LUKoil with a weighted share of the petrol
market of 0.22; Bashneftkhimzavod – 0.15; Sidanko – 0.145; Onako – 0.14), as
well as small independent oil refineries. The average simple share of tolling
contracts in oil supply is lower, at an average weight of 0.689, because of the
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fact that, in this period, small enterprises used tolling contracts less often than
did large firms. The average weighted rate of capacity utilisation is higher than
the simple one for the sample, and is 0.59. There is a negative, although weak,
correlation between it and enterprise size: the five largest enterprises of the
sample had a rate of capacity utilisation of 0.52, compared to 0.7 for the
smallest firms. The own-company share in oil supply has no correlation with the
size of enterprises. The share of insolvency has been proved to have a weakly
negative correlation with enterprise size.
There are two hypotheses to be tested concerning the petrol market. The first
is that the economic performance of sellers depends on their market share,
tolling contracts and excess capacity. The market share of sellers is the share
in the petrol sales of the oil companies (not the refineries) in the national
market. As has been shown in Part 1, oil companies control a significant share
of refinery sales due to tolling contracts and to combining them in vertically-
integrated institutions. Factor analysis has confirmed this hypothesis, revealing
no correlation between the Lerner index of refinery enterprises and their
market share, opposite to the share of the oil companies in petrol market.
The share of tolling contracts in oil supply has been treated as an indicator of
special contracts in the market. The effect of tolling contracts on refinery
performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, tolling contracts should, in
essence, decrease the market power of refineries. On the other hand, tolling
contracts, and not independent decisions on sales and prices, can provide
additional surpluses in the supplier-producer chain. In turn the combination of
the supplier and the producer in an integrated institution should create certain
tools for yielding the re-distribution of surplus towards the minor agents of
vertical integration less connected with the tolling contracts as such.
The third important determinant of market structure has been assumed in the
form of the capacity utilisation rate. The effect of this on the economic
performance of Russian enterprises is still not clear. Most researchers think
that a low capacity utilisation rate is involuntary for Russian enterprises and can
not be treated within the framework of strategic entrance barriers. The
correlation between the capacity utilisation rate and the economic performance
of enterprises is often considered as a remnant of the centrally planned
economy. But, in fact, the capacity utilisation rate was not a strategic
parameter of enterprise choice in Russia.
The regression model to test the first hypothesis is the following:
L = 0.083 + 0.5SHARE + 0.26 TOL – 0.11CAP,
where:
L is the refinery margin;
SHARE is the share of the oil company in the petrol market;
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TOL is the share of tolling in oil supply;
CAP is the rate of capacity utilisation in the refinery.
Some descriptive statistics of the regression are given in the table below.
Parameter Standard error t- statistic p-level
L (intercept) 0.083 0.043 1.44 0.160
SHARE 0.35 0.176 1.99 0.056
TOL 0.26 0.033 7.86 1.8E-08
CAP -0.11 0.05 -2.19 0.037
The number of observations is 31;
R2 = 0.73;
R2 adj. = 0.71;
F(3,27) = 24.91;
The standard error of estimation is 0.066.
The model can confirm the hypothesis of the effects of tolling on the economic
performance of refineries. The correlation is positive. It is confirmed that tolling
contracts increase the profits of a vertically integrated chain and that a part of
the additional surplus is redistributed towards the refineries. At the same time,
the positive influence of the market share of the oil company on the economic
performance of the refineries can also be considered as confirmed. The
negative correlation of margins and the capacity utilisation rate can testify to
the weak link between the economic performance of enterprises and resource
allocation in the former planned economy.
The second hypothesis is that the major reason for tolling contracts is vertical
integration in industry, not the insolvency problem.
In this case, the dependent variable is the tolling share of the total supply of oil
to the refinery. The independent variables are: the oil company share as an
indicator of the degree of vertical integration within the refinery; and the share
of bad debt in the total arrears of an enterprise as the indicator of its financial
problems. As far as the former indicator is concerned, the shares of oil
companies have been summed, if there are several oil companies in a
vertically-integrated firm; while the share of small independent enterprises has
been valued at zero.
Our aim has been to estimate the correlation between the share of tolling and
the two feasible causes: vertical integration and/or insolvency.
The regression model is as follows:
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TOL = -0.156 + 0.989SELF + 0.08DEBT
where:
TOL is the share of tolling in oil supply;
SELF is own-company oil supply;
DEBT is the share of bad debt in total enterprise arrears.
The descriptive statistics are given in the table:
Parameter Standard error t-statistic p-level
TOL
(intercept)
-0.156 0.152 -1.02 0.314
SELF 0.998 0.166 5.96 2.03E-06
DEBT 0.08 0.17 0.45 0.66
The number of observations is 31;
R2 = 0.73;
R2 adj. = 0.71;
F(2,28) = 20.56;
The standard error of estimation is 0.066.
The results of the model have not confirmed the influence of insolvency on
tolling contracts, but they have confirmed the important effect on them of
vertical integration through the indicator of own-company oil supply. The latter
result can be used as an argument for tolling contracts being tools of vertical
integration in Russia.
3.2. Sugar Market: Sugar Refineries
The analysis of the Russian sugar market has been conducted on the basis of
the sample survey made by Goskomstat in the second half of 1996. The
sample included 15 regional markets among which there were 5 sugar
producing and importing regions; 5 sugar producing and exporting regions and
5 sugar importing regions. The economic agents that were selected included
35 sugar producers and 65 wholesale traders with sugar sales amounting to
more than 1/3 of their turnover.
There were two hypotheses to be tested in the sugar market. The first
concerns market performance in general, and the second has a link to the
special determinants of enterprise behaviour in Russia. Two regression models
have been developed accordingly.
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The first hypothesis is the following. Market performance under transition
depends not on factors to do with traditional market structure (primarily the
market share of sellers), but on special contracts during the transition
(predominantly tolling contracts).
To test the hypothesis, the dependent variable is the enterprise margin; the
independent variables are the market share of sellers; the share of tolling in
the supply of sugar beet; and the capacity utilisation rate. The first variable
shows the effect of the traditional market development; the second one the
character of the transition; and the last the remnants of the centrally planned
economy.
The regression model looks like this:
L = 2.7 – 2.74 TOL  + 0.07SHARE + 0.186 CAP,
where:
L is the sugar plant margin (Lerner index);
TOL is the share of tolling in sugar beet supply;
CAP is the capacity utilisation rate;
SHARE is the sellers’ market share.
The results of factor analysis are included in the table:
L
(intercept)
TOL SÍARE CAP
Coefficient of linear
regression
2.7 -2.74 0.07 0.186
Standard error 0.31 -0.319 0.023 0.032
t-statistic 8.8 -8.587 3.093 5.8
Average value 0.43 0.87 0.029 0.62
Standard deviation 0.169 0.049 0.018 0.153
Maximum value 0.7 0.98 0.07 0.8
Minimum value 0.1 0.8 0.01 0.3
The number of observations is 35;
R2  = 0.759;
R2 adjusted  =  0.736;
F (2, 32) = 32.596;
Standard error of estimate = 0.087.
The results show an insignificant influence of the market share of the sellers on
the economic performance of enterprises (the correlation is 0.07). The rather
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large negative correlation between the share of tolling and the margins of
enterprises (-2.74) confirms the effects of special contracts on market
development in Russia: the more the share of tolling in the supply of resources
of a firm, the more dependent on the supplier it has proved to be and the less
is its power in the product market because this power has been transformed
towards the leading element of vertical integration – the supplier. The
significant coefficient of CAP (0.186) indicates the links of enterprises with the
remnants of the planned economy: the higher the capacity utilisation rate (that
is inherited from the past), the higher the possibility of having an influence on
the market.
Thus, factor analysis of the sugar market has confirmed the first hypothesis –
the result is similar to that of the petrol market.
The second hypothesis deals with the causes of tolling contracts. As we noted
in part 2, there are several competing views on this problem. The two most
important are that tolling is a factor of vertical integration and/or it is solely a
financial phenomenon. Our hypothesis has been that tolling is caused by the
processes of vertical integration in industry. To test the hypothesis we have
developed the second regression model.
The tolling share has been taken as the dependent variable with two
independent variables that could help in distinguishing the two points of view –
that of the share of insolvency in total enterprise arrears and a dummy variable
of transaction cost.
The dummy has been constructed in the following way. We have collected data
on the behaviour of sugar refineries, including statistics on the number of
suppliers that each enterprise has (in general, one or many) and survey
statistics. Respondents were asked to estimate the stability of their
relationships with suppliers on the basis of none, weak or strong possibility of
change. If the enterprise has one supplier and does not want to change it, its
transaction cost is the lowest and a value of 0 has been assigned to the
dummy. If the enterprise has many suppliers and plans to change at least
some of them, its transaction cost should be the highest, and a value of 2 has
been assigned to the dummy. Intermediate cases have a dummy of 1 (see
table).
Number of suppliers
Probability of changing suppliers One Many
High 1 2
Low 0 1
The second regression model is as follows:
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TOL = 0.8199 – 0.0004ARR + 0.866TC
where:
TOL is the tolling share in the supply of sugar beet;
ARR is the share of bad debt in the total arrears of enterprises;
TC is the transaction cost dummy.
The results of factor analysis are presented in the table.
TOL
(INTERCEPT)
TC ARR
Coefficient of linear
regression
 0.8199 0.866 -0.00040
Standard error 0.0182 0.09 0.000079
t-statistic 44.946 9.538 -5.05
Average value 0.87 1.14 0.22
Standard deviation 0.0494 0.912 0.058
Maximum value 0.98 2 0.306
Minimum value 0.80 0 0.10
The number  of observations is 35;
R2  = 0.74;
R2 adjusted  =  0.724;
F (2, 32) = 45.64;
Standard error of estimate = 0.0259.
The results of model 2 show that the role played by enterprise financial
problems in the choice of tolling contracts is insignificant: the correlation is
weak and, as expected, negative (-0.0004). Thus, the view on tolling as a
financial problem has not been confirmed.
At the same time, transaction cost has proved to be a more important cause of
tolling contracts, with a positive correlation of 0.866. The higher the level of
transaction cost in the market, the higher is the incentive for enterprises to use
tolling contracts as a tool of vertical integration. Our hypothesis concerning the
essence of tolling contracts under transition have had further confirmation.
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CONCLUSIONS
The results of market analysis allow us to draw some conclusions concerning
the determinants of market developments in the economy under transition.
The special factors of the transition play the most important role in market
developments in Russia. For developed countries, traditional factors of market
power – concentration and the size of sellers – have only a minor influence
under transition.
The effect of producers on prices and sales is declining. At the same time, due
to tolling contracts, the influence of suppliers is going up. In the sugar market,
tolling contracts are used by economic entities which are new to traditional
production and distribution chains. The emergence of these entities in the
markets increases the effects of tolling contracts on production flows and the
economic performance of enterprises.
Tolling contracts are special relationships in the transition economy that have
the most important influence on market developments in Russia. Their effects
are ambiguous. On the one hand, tolling contracts can increase firms’ profits
and consumers’ surplus, compared to independent decisions, thanks to the
partial solution of the double mark-up problem. However, tolling contracts can
not ensure the maximisation of total profits that is possible under vertical
integration. On the other hand, tolling contracts are tolls of suppliers’ market
power.
The more tolling contracts are used, the higher their concentration in the
intermediate product markets. A major factor limiting tolling contracts with
suppliers is the uncertainty of production cost and demand because tolling
contracts place an additional risk on suppliers compared to independent
decision-making. The more the incentives held by producers in tolling
relationships, the higher the demand uncertainty and the lower the production
cost.
Competition in Russian markets is limited not only by a high concentration of
producers but also by institutional and macroeconomic determinants in
general. The special vertical contracts now dominant in Russia reflect the
under-development of the enforcement system for property rights that is the
main factor of market developments in the transition economy.
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Chart 1. Number of refineries and profit of supplier of raw materials
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Chart 2. Profit of vertical chain under different types of contract
arrangements
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Figure 1. Petrol market: distribution channels (1996)
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Figure 2. Sugar market: distribution channels (1996)
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Characteristics of the Data of the State Committee of Statistics
Investigation of the Petrol and Sugar Markets
An investigation of the petrol and sugar markets was carried out by the State
Committee on Statistics during the second half of 1996. The  scope of survey
conducted was the following:
Petrol market Sugar market
Producers 9 35
Agricultural enterprises
(producers of sugar beet)
65
Wholesale traders 58 65
Consumers 190 121
Research was conducted for the following regions:
 Petrol market
Type of region investigated Name of region
Regions where oil is extracted and
processed
Bashkorstan, Komy, Astrakhan, and
Orenburg
Regions where oil is processed but
not extracted
Krasnoyarck, Ryazan, Yaroslavl, and
Omsk
Regions consuming petrol Altay, Murmansk, Pskov, Penza,
Smolensk, Chelyabinsk, and
Kemerovo
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Sugar market
Type of region investigated Name of region
Regions where sugar is produced,
fully provided
Krasnodar, Belgorod, Orel, Kursk,
and Tambov
Regions where sugar is produced and
imported
Mordoviya, Stavropol, Bryansk, Mula,
and Nizny Novgorod
Regions which are net consumers of
sugar
Primorsky, Kaliningrad, Tver, Kaluga,
and Rostov-on-Don
Characteristics of Petrol Market Database (1996)
Margin Share of oil
company in
production
Share of
tolling
contracts
Rate of
capacity
utilisation
Share of oil
supply by
its own
company
Share of
insol-
vency
Average 0.137 0.066 0.58 0.658 0.613 0.398
Standard
error
0.021 0.012 0.066 0.042 0.053 0.05
Mean 0.145 0.040 0.450 0.688 0.6 0.3
Standard
deviation
0.122 0.069 0.369 0.239 0.297 0.284
Minimum -0.149 0.00496 0 0.139 0.08 0.04
Maximum 0.352 0.22 1 1 1 0.87
